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A REVENUE-RESTRIC1ED COST STUDY OF THE PROPERTYLIABILITY JNSURA CE INDUSTRY
L. Dean Hiebert
Han Bin Kang
George 8 . Flanigan

INTRODUCTIO
A number of studies have exammed econorrues of scale in the property-habthty insurance
industry (see Geheen, 1986 for a survey). Since output is used as the measure of scale within this
literature, the proper spec1ficat1on and measurement of insurer output ts crucial in mvestigating
economies of scale. However, no general consensus regarding the appropriate measurement of
1
insurer output has emerged m the lnerature. The lack of agreement 1s reflected m the diversity of
the output measures used in past studies. For example, previous researchers have employed
premiums written (Cummms and VanDerhe1. 1979: Barrese and Nelson. 1992). premiums earned
(Johnson, R arugan and Weisbart. 198 I). claims prud (Doherty. 198 I: Skogh, 1982). and losses
incurred (Cumrruns and Weiss. 1993) as measures of insurance outpu1.
Each of these altemattve measures has senous shortcommgs when used as a proxy for the
quantity of services provided by an msurance firm. The use of prerruums (wntten or earned) is
equivalent to measunng cutput by total sales revenue. a measure that depends upon the firm's pricing
policy. If product prices vary systemattcally with msurer size. then the use of preD11um mcome as a
proxy for output can result m biased esumation of the relat1onsh1p between costs and the scale of
pro:lucuon. 03.JillS payments serve as a proxy for the nsk beanng services provided by the insurer,
hut claims paid or mcurred do not adequately represent other services such as loss settlement services
and mtermediauon services that are also provided as part of the insurer's ou1pu1.
Since the chace of cut put measure can mf1uence the empincal results concerrung econonues of
scale. the proper measurement of cutput remains a cnucal unsettled issue in insurance cost research.
In a survey of the msurance cost literature. Geehan concluded that "the detenruna11on of an
appropriate measure of output constitutes the single most important problem for research m this
area." ( 1986, p. 139).
This paper directly addresses the unresolved issue of output measurement by employmg a
"revenue-restncted" cost functton 10 the est1mat10n of costs m the property-hab1lity msurance
industry. Theoretically. the re,enue-restncted cost function 1s denved by oururruzmg the cost of
pro:lucmg a spec,fied level of total revenue. given technology and mput and output pnces (Shephard.
1974). Smee the revenue-restncted cost functton employs total revenue rather than output as a
measure of overall scale, its applicauon to the insurance mdustry offers a theoret1cally correct metho:I
of sidesteppmg the controversy surroundmg the measurement of insurance outpul. Although this
approach avoids the need to measure insurance output, the use of a revenue-restricted cost function
doos require appropnate measures of product price. Fortunately, the available proxies for msurance
pnoo are much less comroversial than are the avrulable proxies for insurance output. Shaffer (1994)
has estimated a revenue-restricted cost func11on for a sample of large commercial banks.
Recent studies of insurer costs have explic11ly recognized the multtproduct character of the
typical insurance firm (Cummms and Weiss. 1993. Hanweck and Hogan. 1996). The revenue-20-
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restricted co;t function offers an additional advantage for the study of scale economies in the context
of multiproduct production. The usual measure of overall economies of scale is based on the
summation of the partial elasticities of co;t with respect to each of the separate outputs, implying that
the production of all outputs is expanded in the same proportion as finn scale increases. If the
optimal rutput mix changes as firms grow in size (the expansion path in output space is nonlinear).
then this measure may understate the actual cost economies associated with larger scale. Since the
revenue-restricted CC6l function assumes that firms choose an optimal mix of both outputs and inputs
at any given scale. the approach taken in the present paper avoids this source of potential estimation
bias. A potential drawback of the present approach, however. is the inability to estimate economies
of scope since output quantities are not included in the analysis.
Toe paper is organized as follows: review of the results of previous property-liability insurance
cost s tudies regarding economies of scale; presentation of the revenue-restricted cost function;
discussion of the model and data used in the empirical analysis; presentation of the results; and
conclusion.

PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous cost studies of the property-liability insurance industry have reported conflicting
evidence regarding the presence of economies of scale. The majority of these studies have estimated
a s ingle product cost function having the Cobb-Douglas functional form. Allen (1974), CUmmins
(1977). CUmmins and VanDerhei (1979). and Johnson. Flanigan and Weisbart (1981) used a
premiums-based measure as the proxy for output in their analyses. Allen found evidence of
economies of scale for small-sized insurers, but n(){ for medium- and large-sized insurers. In contrast.
Johnson. Flanigan and Weisban reported significant diseconomies of scale for small- and mediumsized insurers and significant economies of scale for large insurers. CUmmins found no evidence of
economies of scale in his study. while CUmmins and VanDerhei reported moderate scale economies
among insurers in their sample.
Doherty (1981) and Skogh (1982) use a claims-based measure as the proxy for output in their
s tudies of insurer costs. Doherty finds evidence of significant economies of scale in the Canadian
property-liability insurance industry. Similarly. Skogh detects strong economies of scale in the
Swedish property-liability insurance industry. Although Doherty and Skogb argue that a claims-based
measure is theoretically superior 10 a preauurns-based measure of insurance output. they also
esumated economies of scale using a premiums-based output measure. Both authors found that the
use of premiums as the proxy for output resulled in smaller estimates of scale economies.
More recently, Barrese and Nelson (1992) also employed alternative measures of output in their
cost study. When premiums were used as the output proxy. they fou nd no evidence of economies of
scale. In contrast. they found significant economies of scale when losses were used as the proxy for
output. CUmmins and Weiss (1993) estimated a mulliproduct cost function for property-liability
insurers. Their results suggest that economies of scale exist for small- and medium-sized firms. while
d1seconomies of scale prevail for large firms. Using a premiums based measure of insurer output.
Hanweck and Hoo,,an ( 1996) also estimated a multi product co;t function for property-liability insurers.
They found significant economies of scale for small firms and diseconomies of scale for the largest
firms in the industry. In view of the mixed evidence on econoaues of scale in the property-liability
insurance industry. fut1her empirical study seems warranted.'
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THE REVENUE-RESTRJCTED CO T FUNCTION

Toe standaro cost function provides a theoretical framework for previous insurance cost studies.
This cost function is derived by minimizing the cost of producing a specified output mix. given the
input prices. Fonnally. tl1t> stamfard ca.l function. C(q, w). is denved from the solution to the
problem

C(q,w) = minxw•x subject to T(q,x) =O

(I)

where q is a vector of outputs, w is a vector of input pnces. x 1s a vector of inputs, and T(q, x) is the
transformation function lhal characterizes the firm's technology. Thus, this cost function describes
lhe minimum expenditure required to produce a given output mix al given input prices. Since lhe
optimization is conditional on lhe oolpul vector q. tl1e standard cost function is known as the "outpulrestricted" form of the cost function.
The alternative "revenue-restricted" form of lhe cost function gives lhe rrunimum expenditure
required toprcxluce a given level of total revenue al given output and input prices (Shephard, 1974;
Brown and Chachere, 1986). This form of the cost function i~ defined by the solution to the problem

C(R,p, w) = minz,q w · x subject to p · q - R =0 and T(q,x)

=0 (2)

where R denOles tOlai revenue and p 1s a vector of output prices. Conceptually, the revenue-restricted
cost funcuon can be obta1Ded ID a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the standard cost function
is obtained. In the second stage. the revenue-restncted cost func11on rs obtarned as the solution to the
problem

C(R, p, w) = minq C(q,p, w) subject to p · q- R = 0 .

(3)

Thus. the revenue-restncted cost function describes the cost of the optimal (cost-rnirurruung) output
nux that is capable of generat1Dg a pre-specified level of revenue. 3 1l1e revenue-restricted cost
function provides a more general framework than the standard cost function for the estimation of
muluprcxluct econorrues of scale. If the opumal output nux changes as firm size IDCreases (lhe output
expansion path is nonlmear), lhen the standard cost approach that measures mul11product econonues
of scale along a ray ID output space (imphc11ly assumrng a linear output expansion path) will
understate the cost econonues associated wtth larger scale. Since the revenue-restricted cost function
explicitly accounts for changes ID the output nux as fim1 size increases. 1l avoids this potential source
of bias ID the estimation scale econonues.
The revenue-restncted cost function C(R, p, w) satisfies certarn monotonicity and homogeneity
conditions (Shephard. 1974). Like tl1e standard cost fu nction, the revenue-restricted cost function
is an increasing function of input pnces as well as homogeneous of degree one in the input pnces.
In addition, tl1e revenue restricted cost functi on is increasing ID total revenue, decreasing in output
prices. and homogeneous of degree zero ID revenue and the output pnces.
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EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
The authors utilize a translog functional fonn in the estimation of !he revenue-restricted cost
function. C(R, p, w). The translog function is a standard flexible functional fonn that can be
interpreted as a first-order approximation to a general revenue-restricted cost function. This form of
the cost function does not restrict the cost function to constant elasticity of scale. The model includes
six rutpul prices and one input ptit:e as well as dummy variables for organizational fonn, distribution
system. and year. The cost function can be wnllen as

L

In C = a. 0 +a.n In R +

+

L
6

1=1

f3 R, In RI n p, + 2 L
I

+ y Rw In Rln w +

L

CL,

In P, + a. .,. In w +

I

2PRR(ln R)2

L f3 v In p, In p , + 2I p,.... (In w)

y ,.,. In P, In w +
where In is a loganthmic transformation. /J,, - f,1,(/

L

2

&k Dk + E

J) by the assumption of symmetry. and where;

C

total costs (undcrwnting expenses incurred, loss adjustment expenses incurred: or
underwnting plus loss adjustment expenses incurred)

R

net premiums wnllen

P,

pnce of Homeowners insurance

P,

pnce of Conunerc1al Multiple Peril insurance

P,

=

price of Workers' Compensation insurance

P,

=

pnce of Auto Liability insurance

PJ

=

pnce of Auto Physical Damage insurance

P6

=

price of Other Liability insurance

II'

=

pnce of labor

D,

=

I for stock comparues and O otherwise
I for independent agency comparues and O otherwise

D,
D,

(4)

=

I for exclusive agency companies and Ootherwise

D, =

I for year 1989 and O otherwise

Dj =

1 for year 1990 and O otherwise

D6 =

I for year 1991 and O otherwise

E
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A stock-mutual dummy variable was included to account for pa;sible differences in cost
structures resulting from d ifferences in tJ1e severity of the s tandard agency conflict between owners
and managers. Two additional dummyva1iables were included to allow for pa;sible cost differences
attributable to alternative marketing systems. "lhe first 1s specified to account for distribution through
tJ1e independent agency system. while the second is introduced to account for utilization of exclusive
agency marketing systems. 'l11e remaining comparues 111 tJ1e sample are salaried representative
companies and other direct sales companies such as nrnil order. ·11ie year dununy variables were
induc.lec.l to rcllect temporal cllccts that wc1c conunon lo all i11surc1s and to lake ac.:cuunt of yearly
effects that may be present Ix-cause costs and p1iccs "'ere 1ccuidcd as nominal values.
'll1e thc01clical 1~<1uircmenl lhal the 1cvcnue-1eslnctcd c~l function is homogeneous of degree
1.ero in revenue and the output p1iccs 1c4u11cs the fullowrng pa1Jme1er 1cstnct1ons:'

(5)

Y Rw + L Y,.,=

(6)

Q

for each;

(7)

(8)

An approp1iale local measure of econonucs of scale 1s the elasllcity of cost with respect 10
revenue, S = clnC/clnR. ·nus elasucity measures tJ1e proportional 111crease 111 total cost that
accompanies a proportional increase 111 total revenue. keeptng pnces. organizational form, and
distnbution system unchanged. ll is important to emphasize tJ1al this elasticity of cost with respect
to scale 1mplic1tly accamts for tJ1e effect of a change 111111su1er size on the optimal output mix. Thus.
this measure 1s appropnate for accurately pred1ct111g changes in cost that accompany changes in
insurer size, regardless of how changes 111 size affect the product nux.s A value of S less (greater)
tJ1an one 1mphes tl1e ex1s1ence ofecononucs (d1secononucs) of scale. A nex1ble functional fonn such
as the translog function docs not impa;e a ny a pnori 1es1nction o n the elasticities
of the fum:tion. For tJ1c tianslog c-ust lunc..l10n 111 e4u.ollon (4), the scale elasticity 1s given by

(9)

Stnce !lie scale elasticity is a function of 1evenue (as well as the output and tnput pnces). tJ1e
value of Sat different fim1 sizes is estimated.
Many piev1ous rese:uchets have implemented empuical tes ts of economies of scale 111 insurance
by esumating a cost function 111 which tOlal p1emium 1evenue serves as the output measure. 'Ille
theory of tl1e 1evenue-reslricted cost function suggests tJ1al tJ1e estimating equation used by tl1ese
researchers is ausspecified since the output pnces are not included in tl1e analysis. l11e autl1ors'
1esults can be seen as co1Tect111g this 011uss1011.
-24-
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The data used in this study are obtained from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners data tapes of annual reports of property-liability insurers for the years J988 through
1991. The estimation of a revenue-restricted cost function requires information on the output prices.
The output price is unobserved when an insurer chooses not to produce a particular product.•
Consequently, a subset of companies was selected for which premiums written was positive in each
of s ix major insurance lines: homeowners. commercial multiple peril, workers' compensation, auto
liability, auto physical damage, and other liability. Companies that had no business in any one of
these six lines were excluded from the sample since the approach used in this paper requires
measures of rut put price. The accuracy of the data for each variable was examined and some firms
were dropped from the sample because of inconsistencies in the recorded data. Records with unusual
values were also eliminated from the sample. The resulting sample comprises a total of 886
observations for the fair year period. The companies in this sample receive over 80 percent of their
total revenue from business in these six major lines. The mean value of annual net premiums written
by firms in the sample is approximately S300 million, while the median value is approximately S72
million.
Total costs. C, are specified as underwriting expenses incurred plus loss adjustment expenses
incurred. Prices for each insurance line are measured by earned premiums divided by incurred losses
7
(revenue per dollar of coverage). Larger values of this proxy indicate higher output prices. For each
insurer. the price of labor is computed as the weighted average of the statewide annual salaries for
property and casualty employees reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The weights are the
proportions of the insurer's total premiums accounted for by each state. The authors have not
included the prices of financial or physical capital in the analysis due to data availability problems.
The only available measure of the price of physical capital is based on the book value of buildings
and equipment and is nO! an adequate proxy for the cost of physical capital since book values do not
represent true rental costs.
All of the nondichotomous nght-hand side variables were normalized 10 equal I at the median
value of the sample. This normalization procedure is equivalent to taking the sample median as the
point of approximation of the true cost function by the translog function.

EMPIRICAL RE ULTS
The revenue-restncted cost function (4) was estimated by ordinary least squares with the
homogeneity restrictions (5)-(8) imposed on the esurnation. Table I presents the parameter estimates
together with the corresponding 1-statistics. All of the estimated linear coefficients of the output
prices have the theoreucally correct negative sign. and five of the six coefficients are significantly
different from zero at the I percent confidence level. In addition. the linear coefficient of the wage
variable is positive. as predicted by theory. and significant a t the I percent level. 3
The estimated scale elasticities are presented in Table 2. As a flexible functional form. the
traoslog cost function allows the scale elasucity to depend on prices as well as the revenue level. The
authors report estimates of the scale elasticity where output prices and the wage rate are held fixed
at their median values and R is chosen 10 correspond 10 the 25. 50 and 75 percentile levels observed
in the sample. These points can be interpreted as representative of"small." "medium," and "large"
firms, respectively. In all three cases. the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. H0 :S - I. and
is rejec ted at the one percent significance level. Since all of the estimated values of the _scale
elasticity are less than one. the estimated cost function displays statistically significant economtes of
scale for the three size groups observed in the sample. These results imply that e:en_ l~rg~ insurers
have not exploited the potential economies of scale that e xist in the property-hab1hty msurance
Sou,hern Business Revt~h'
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industry. This result contrasts with that of Cummins and Weiss ( I 993) who find that the largest
insurers are operating in the region of diseconomies of scale.

TABLE 1
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF TH E TRANSLOG REVENUE RESTRICTED COST
FUNCTION
Parameter

Estimate

I-statistic

ao
aR
a,
a,
al
a,
a,
a6
aw
PRR
PR,
Piu
PR)
PR,
PRS
PR6
P11

3.3165
0.97452

l 15.1
236.0

-0.19367

-5.663

p,.
p)l
p)4

-0.08462

-3.351

P)s

-6.042
-6.333

p)6
p..,

-6.959

-0.01628

-1.201

P,s

0.54249

5.597

-0.00363

-1.086

0.05 135

2.640

0.02223

1.519

-0.03410

-2.318

-0.05318

-2.264

0.03840

1.703
-2.443

p.,
pl)
p,.

-0.07239

-0.684

-0.02027

-0.212

P,s
P,6

0.01751

0.157

0.05591

0.882

P,.

p,,
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-0.15742
-0.26136
-0.26116

-0.02107

p,,
pl)

Parameter

0.11231

1.219

-0.14443

-1.049

0.10114

2.001

0.00434

0.076

0.03682

0.412

-0.07878

-0.648

p46

Pss
Pso

p.,.

Estimate

I-statistic

-0.06548

- 1.927

-0.02371

-0.41 1

0.06570

0.596

-0. 16244

-1.33 I

0.03791

1.108

0.40400

2.546

-0.443 12

-2.597

0.13422

2.289

0.72288

3.942

-0.10445

-1.59 I

-0.03706

-1.223
-0.518

-0.48393

Pww
YRw
Ytw

0.17044

3.464

-0.08739

-0.284

Yz"'

-0.38557

-1.671

0.24498

0.996

YJw
Y,w
Ys.
Y6•
D,
D,
03
D,
Ds
06

0.59404

1.646

-0.49145

-1.267

-0.04504

-0.318

-0.02742

- 1.965

0.21155

10.11

-0.02120

-0.639

-0.10978

-4.910

-0.10384

-4.044

-0.05413

-2.779
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TABLE2
ESTIMATED SCALE ELASTICITIES, WHOLE SAMPLE

Percentile
Evaluation Point

Estimated

s

Standard
Error

Total Expenses

I-statistic
H :S I

25%

0.9782

0.005985

0.9745

-3.635

50%

0.004129

-6.170

75%

0.9701

0.005001

-5.969

Underwriting Expenses
25%

0.9720

0.008906

-3.139

50%

0.9679

75%

0.9630

0.006145
0.007442

-5.226
-4.971

Loss Adjustment Expenses
25%

0.9936

0.008926

-0.71 2

50%

0.9969

0.006159

-0.499

75%

1.0008

0.007458

0.105

The estimate of the scale elasticity at the median insurer size (0.9745) is comparable 10 that
obtained by Shaffer ( 1994) for large U.S. banks. Although the scale elasticity is near one. the implied
scale effects can nevertheless result in substanual differences in average costs over a sufficiently wide
range of insurer sizes.
The effect of the wage rate on the scale elasticity. c'S/<3.v = Y11w- is positive and significant. Thus.
higher wage firms have higher values of S. 1f all else is constant. For example. the estimated
parameter value YRw - 0.1704 implies that a wage rate that is 20 percent above the sample median
increases the scale elasticity by 0. 1704(1n 1.20) - 0.03 1 I. The effects of the product prices on the
scale elasticity, o'Slop, - /JR,. are also generally statistically significant. However. since the
coefficients are small in absolute size and of ouxed signs, the overall effect of product prices on Sis
minor. For example. product prices that are 20 percent above the sample median will serve to
decrease the scale elasticity by I:6 , _ 1~11, • (lnl.2) - 0.00363(ln 1.2) - 0.00065. Thus. the effects of
product prices on economies of scale can be safely ignored.
In order to investigate the source of the econonues of scale, the authors also estimated a partial
cost function in which underwritmg expenses incurred and loss adjustment expenses incurred were
used as dependent variables in separate regressions.• The results of the test of economies of scale
in unde1writing and in loss adjustment for the full sample are shown in Table 2. The results indicate
that statistically significant economies of scale are present at all size levels in underwriting services
but not in loss adjustment services. A partial explanation for the absence of economies of scale in
loss adjustment expenses is that small insurers frequently purchase loss adjustment services from
large firms that specialize in providing loss adjustment services to their subscribers. This
arrangement affords smaller insurers the opportunity to realize cost savings arising from economies
of scale in the provision of loss adjustment services.
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Toe translog ccst function can be interpreted as a local approximation to some " true" underlying
ca;t functioo. However, a local approximation may not adequately represent the global behavior of
insurer costs. In order to explore this possibility, the authors estimated separate cost fu nctions for
two subsets of the data. One subset consisted of ..large" insurers with written premiums exceeding
the median value in the sample as a whole, while the other subset consisted of "small" insurers with
written premiums below the median. Thus, the median size in the small group corresponds to the
25 percentile point in the whole sample while the median size in the large group corresponds to the
75 percentile point in the whole sample. Table 3 reports the scale elasticities for the "small" and
"large" firms with revenue and prices evaluated at the median for the respective subsamples. 10 Tue
estimated ccst function for the smaller firms displays statistically significant economies of scale for
total cost as well as for underwriting and loss adjustment services. For larger insurers, statistically
significant scale economies are present in the provision of underwriting services, but not in la;s
adjustment services or in total expenses. These results are broadly similar to those obtained by
Cummins and Weiss ( 1993) who estimated standard multi product translog cost functions for three
size groups. They found that economies of scale are present for small- and medium-sized insurers
but that mild diseconomies of scale prevail for large insurers. The estimates in Table 3 imply that
fitting the same translog cost function to data on both large and small insurers results in
underestimates ofeconomies of scale for small insurers and overestimates of economies of scale for
large insurers.

TABLE3
ESTIMATED SCALE ELASTICITIES, SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS
Estimated

s

Standard
Error

0.9365
0.9857

0.01597

-3.976

0.01035

-1.384

Small Firms

0.9285

La ree Firms

0.02863

-2.497

0.9750

0.01035

-2.418

Total
Ex enses
Small Firms
La rge Firms

!-statistic
H : S= 1

Under writing
Ex enses

Loss Adjustment
Ex enses
Small Firms

0.9358

La rge Firms

0.02159

-2.974

1.0182

0.01774

I.026

An imponant byproduct of this study is evidence concerning the effects on costs of differences
m organizational form and markeung sy.aem. For the full sample of firms, the coefficient of the stock
dummy variable is negative and significantly different from zero. This finding supports the notion
that stock companies will be more cost efficient than mutual companies. The coefficient of the
-28-
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independent agency variable is significantly positive. Thus, companies that market through
independent agents appear to have higher costs than companies that market their product through
exclusive agents or on a non-<:oDlil1ission basis, confinning the results of previous studies (CUmmins
and VanDerhei, 1979; Barrese and Nelson, 1992; Flanigan, Winkler and Johnson, 1993). Toe
coefficient of the exclusive agency variable is negative but insignificant. Finally, the time dummies
for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 are all negative and significant, indicating a general downward
trend in costs for all property-liability insurers. This trend may have been associated with
technological advances as well as improvements in firm efficiency stimulated by a competitive market
environment.

CONCLUSION
This paper bas applied a revenue-restricted multiproduct cost function in the analysis of
economies of scale in the property-liability insurance industry. The approach offers a theoretically
correct method of sidestepping the controversy surrounding the measurement of insurance output.
Ao imponant feature of the estimated cost structure is the existence of economies of scale for a wide
range of company sizes, including the largest firms in this sample.
This analysis suggests that potential cost savi ngs are associated with mergers among even large
insurers. This incentive to auain greater scale augments the mounting pressure on property-liability
insurers 10 consolidate in order to bolster their financial strength in the face of large natural
catastrophes and environmental losses. Offseu ing the efficiency consequences of merger activity are
potential inefficiencies associated with increases in market power.

ENDNOTES
1
For general discussions of output measurement see Geheen (1986), O'Brien (1991) and
CUmmins and Weiss (1993).

Several recent studies have also exarruned scale economies for the property-liability insurance
industry 10 Italy (Eisen. I 99 I). France (Fecher, Perelman. and Pesticau. I 99 I} and Canada (Suret.
1991}.
2

1 NOie that a profit maximizing firm necessarily produces its chosen revenue level at least cost.
so that the revenue-restricted cost function is implied by the assumption of profit maximization.

'The homogeneity restricuon for input prices is ignored in the estimation since only one input
price was included.
5 In a multi product cost function approach. global economies of scale are usually assessed by
assuming that all outputs are increased in the same proportion as firm si~ grows. The authors·
approach av01ds this restnction. and thus. is more useful for accurately pred1ct10g the actual effects
of firm size on costs.
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6It is act legitimate to use a :zero price in place of the unobserved price. The correct price is the
price that would be observed if the firm chose to sell the product.

7 Braeutigam and Pauly (1986) and Doherty and Kang (1988) have used this measure of
insurance price. It would be desirable to adjust the price measure to differentiate long-tail liability
lines from short-tail property lines. A fund-generating coefficient (reserves divided by earned
premiums) can be used for the price adjustment. However, the adjustment is not included in this
study because the effects are expected to be minor.
8
Toe linear coefficients of the output and input price variables correspond to the elasticities of
cost with respect to price. evaluated at the median values of all variables ID the sample.
9

Note that estimating a partial cost function implies a specification error unless the cost function
is strongly separable.
10
A test of the restriction of identical cost functions for the two size groups was rejected at the
!%level.
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